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INTRODUCTION 
"National security" is a phrase which lacks a definition. M.L. Freidland 
commenced his study for The Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain 
Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police with the following state-
ment: "I start this study on the legal dimensions of national security with a 
confession: I do not know what national security means. But then, neither 
does the government."1 The dimensions of the concept of national security 
have not only eluded academics and politicians but also the judiciary. 
During a discussion of the diverging views on the use of the investiga-
tive technique of eavesdropping, Mr. Justice Black of the United States Su-
preme Court stated that ". . . others would bar it except in searching for 
evidence in the field of "national security," whatever that means,.. ..,n One 
view is that the term is indefinable, but, like obscenity, people know it when 
they see it.3 This was the view held by the UK Committee of Privy Counsel-
lors on Ministerial Memoirs, which in 1976 stated: 
National security is a vague enough idea in the conditions of 
die modem world and its subjects range much further afield 
than the simpler categories of earlier days, such as the plans of 
fortresses or the designs of warships or aeroplanes. Neverthe-
less, experience has shown that, when it comes to a practical 
issue turning on a particular set of facts, it is not usually 
difficult to agree whether they fall within or without the secu-
rity net.4 
Given the public's reaction to revelations with respect to RCMP activi-
ties during the 1970s and the recent controversy surrounding the role of 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in Canadian society, it is quite 
optimistic to assume that there is general agreement on whether or not a 
particular set of facts fall within or without the security net. In a recent text 
on national security law the authors point out the importance of defining the 
phrase "national security": 
The stakes in defining national security are high. Those who 
succeed in associating national safety or national defense with 
their position on an issue generally achieve the high ground in 
public debate.3 
This article will illustrate that there is a need in Canada to develop a 
workable definition, or test, which can be used as a point of reference in an 
examination of how the phrase "national security" (and synonymous phrases, 
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such as "security of Canada") is employed by the Canadian government and 
the courts. Further, it will suggest criteria for use in determining what 
"national interests" should be elevated to "national security interests." 
In Friedland's 1979 study he stated that the phrase "national security" 
was not used in Canadian legislation.6 Today however, the phrase "national 
security" is used in no fewer man six federal statutes7 and four regulations8 
pursuant to federal statutes. In addition, a number of other statutes use the 
phrase "security of Canada,"9 and there are other statutes which, while they do 
not employ the term "national security" or "security of Canada," clearly 
concern themselves with national security.10 Even with the increase in the use 
of the term "national security," nowhere is it defined. 
There are three serious consequences of this failure to define or estab-
lish a test of "national security" that I will examine. First, because the term 
"national security" is not defined, Parliament is unable to adequately define 
what amounts to a "threat to the security of Canada." Second, because there 
are currently no boundaries as to what can be done in the name of national 
security, there is tremendous potential for abuse, particularly by the executive 
branch of government. Third, even in light of the courts' new role since the 
advent of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in the area of national 
security the courts appear to show deference to the government's position. 
THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF CANADA (Whatever that means) 
National security is a term which is used by the government to justify 
placing the most extreme limitations on Canadian's rights and freedoms. 
"Threats to national security" is a convenient way of describing a growing 
range of matters from "espionage" to "subversion" and "terrorism" (a term 
which also appears to be expanding, eg. "narco"-terrorism). Without a defi-
nition of the phrase "national security," however, it is impossible to define 
those situations which amount to a threat to national security. A brief review 
of the possible interpretations of section 2 of the Canadian Security Intelli-
gence Service Act (CSIS Act) illustrates this point 
The primary function of CSIS is set out in section 12 of the CSIS Act: 
The service shall collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the 
extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyze and retain infor-
mation and intelligence respecting activities that may on rea-
sonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the 
security of Canada and, in relation thereto, shall report and 
advise the Government of Canada. 
Under the authority of a warrant CSIS may employ intrusive investiga-
tive techniques such as the opening of mail, electronic surveillance, surrepti-
tious entry, search and seizure. CSIS has, however, been given the mandate 
to pursue information under section 12 with such vigor only with respect to 
activities that "may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats 
to the security of Canada." Hence, the justification of any possible Charter 
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violations will rest in the interpretation of a threat to national security or, in 
the words of the CSIS Act, "threats to the security of Canada." 
"Threats to the security of Canada" are defined in section 2 of the CSIS 
Act as follows: 
(a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detri-
mental to the interests of Canada or activities directed 
towards or in support of such espionage or sabotage, 
(b) foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada 
that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are 
clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person, 
(c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in 
support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence 
against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a 
political objective within Canada or a foreign state, and 
(d) activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful 
acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the 
destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitution-
ally established system of government in Canada, but does 
not include lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless car-
ried on in conjunction with any of the activities referred to 
in paragraphs (a) to (d). 
The four general elements of the definition clearly are: espionage and sabo-
tage, foreign-influenced activities, politically motivated violence, and subver-
sion. This definition of a "threat to national security" as disclosed in section 
2 of the CSIS Act is ambiguous and open-ended. 
Would the phrase "detrimental to the interests of Canada," found in 
paragraph 2(a), allow CSIS to investigate espionage against another country? 
Moreover, paragraph (a) suggests that investigations quite removed from 
actual or apprehended acts of espionage or sabotage, both physically and 
temporally, would be permitted. Also, does the broad wording of paragraph 
(b) in regard to "foreign-influenced activities" allow CSIS to investigate 
economic ventures of foreign countries or foreign based multi-national enter-
prises in Canada?11 
Paragraph 2(c) allows the use of intrusive techniques to monitor "activi-
ties . . . in support of . . . acts of serious violence . . . for the purpose of 
achieving a political objective within Canada or a foreign state." Would 
intrusive surveillance techniques have been available to collect information 
about Canadian citizens who, on their own initiative, had collected money for 
the rebels in Afghanistan or the students' pro-democracy movement in China? 
Or would this fund-raising have been protected by the final words of section 
2 which exclude "lawful advocacy, protest or dissent"? Although it is not 
clear if section 2 would apply to these situations it could be argued that they 
present no genuine security threat 
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Paragraph 2(d) would make intrusive investigative techniques available 
for "activities . . . intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow 
by violence of the constitutionally established system of government in Canada." 
It has been stated that "[w]hen ultimate intentions become the operative 
threshold, there is a great danger that speculation rather than evidence would 
be at a premium."12 What will constitute the evidence required to illustrate an 
"ultimate" intention? 
Activities "intended to ultimately lead to" the overthrow by violence of 
the system of government in Canada could include lawful conduct which may 
take place years before the anticipated illegality. It is difficult to comprehend 
the necessity of allowing electronic surveillance for something as distant as 
"activities intended ultimately" to overthrow the government of Canada by 
violence. 
Would paragraph 2(d) allow for the surveillance of members of the Parti 
Québécois or the Confederation of Regions party? Both parties advocate 
major changes to the system of government in Canada. However, neither 
party advocates violence in pursuit of its goals. Does the word "intended," in 
paragraph 2(d) refer to a subjective or objective intention? Objectively, 
activities directed toward the implementation of a policy advocating one 
official language or the separation of a province from Canada may ultimately 
lead to violence and a destruction of our present version of a constitutionally 
established system of government 
The Security Intelligence Review Committee, in both its 1985-8613 and 
its 1986-8714 annual reports, expressed concern that the definition of "threats 
to the security of Canada" in section 2 of the CSIS Act may be too broad. The 
lack of a more precise definition as to what is a "threat to the security of 
Canada" has not provided CSIS with a clear enough mandate as to what 
activities they should, and what activities they should not, be investigating. 
The Independent Advisory Team appointed by the Solicitor General on 22 
July 1987 to review, among other matters, CSIS's operational policies, stated 
that the section 2 definition of "threats to the security of Canada" does not 
provide intelligence officers with the proper guidance required to target threats.13 
The Advisory Committee recommended that "policy standards" and "opera-
tional interpretations" necessary to establish an operational framework for 
paragraphs 2(a) to (d) of the CSIS Act be developed.16 As the Review 
Committee commented: "[S]ome of the threats described by CSIS are clear-
cut; all loyal Canadians would agree that they deserve the Service's unremit-
ting attention. But some left us perplexed."17 
In September 1990, the Report of the Special Committee on the Review 
of the CSIS Act and the Security Offences Act recommended changes to 
section 2 of the CSIS Act to the government18 Pursuant to section 69 of the 
CSIS Act this Committee was charged with completing a comprehensive 
review of the provisions and operation of the Act and submitting a report to 
Parliament which included a statement of any changes the Committee recom-
mended. The government's response to the Special Committee's suggested 
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amendments was vague and noncommittal, the spirit of which is captured in 
the following passage: 
There may be reasons to open the two Acts for amendment in 
the future, given evolving jurisprudence and the continuing 
development of the new system. But the Government does not 
believe legislative changes are required at present. In many 
cases where the Special Committee has recommended amend-
ments to deal with issues, the Government believes further 
policy development would address the concerns raised. In 
other cases, further review of the functioning of the national 
security system is required before définitive judgments can be 
made. The Government does not favour altering the intricate 
system of checks and balances established by the Acts. So far, 
these have served Canadians well in ensuring effective national 
security with due regard for the fundamental rights of individu-
als.19 
Be it a change to policy or to legislation, the effect of attempting to 
narrow or clarify the definition of a "threat to the security of Canada" is a 
circuitous attempt to identify what the legislation is endeavoring to protect 
(that is, "national security"). However, without a definition of the term 
"national security" the government will never be able make its intentions 
known, either to the public or to intelligence officers, as to what situations 
they believe amount to a threat to the security of Canada. 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF 
GOVERNMENTS' POTENTIAL TO ABUSE THEIR POWER 
According to Australian intelligence historian Frank Cain, "[intelligence 
organizations are political bodies established to solve political problems — " ^ 
Historically, governments have received criticism on their use of intrusive 
investigative techniques under the pretext of protecting "national security." 
An insight into the reason for this criticism may have been uncovered by 
recent research. A study by Joeseph Fletcher indicates that the ordinary 
Canadian is more skeptical about wiretapping by security services then are 
government decision-makers.21 
The findings reported here on Canadian attitudes likewise sug-
gest opposing perspectives among those who are governed. 
Across the full range of threats to national security outlined in 
the C.S.I.S. Act, the responses of ordinary Canadians reveal 
caution or skepticism regarding government surveillance of 
private telephone conversations, whereas the responses of the 
decision makers indicate greater acceptance of such intrusions 
as an instrument of government control in service of national 
security.22 
The disparity of opinion between ordinary Canadians and decision-
makers may be explained by the fact that the decision-makers have greater 
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knowledge of the protection afforded by law to individuals suspected of being 
a threat to the security of Canada. Regardless of this knowledge, when asked 
about wiretapping, decision-makers "... have a much harder time saying "no" 
than the public — even when the threat is nothing more serious than holding 
radical ideas."23 This difference in attitude between government and the 
ordinary citizen as to what situations call for the use of wiretapping in the 
name of national security may even exist between governments and their own 
security services. 
According to Peter Wright, the author of the book Spy catcher, in the late 
1950's the British Government was hosting an Argentine delegation during 
negotiations for a meat contract between the two governments. 
Hollis [the head of MIS] passed down a request from die Board 
of Trade for any intelligence, and instructed us to arrange for 
microphone coverage of the Argentines. Winterbom and I 
were outraged. It was a clear breach of the Findlater-Stewart 
memorandum, which defined MIS's purposes as strictly those 
connected with national security. The rest of the A2 staff felt 
exactly as we did, and Hollis's instruction was refused.24 
It has long been recognized mat governments have great flexibility 
when their actions are cloaked in terms of national security: 
Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find 
it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their 
safety seems to be die first The safety of the people doubtless 
has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considera-
tions, and consequently affords great latitude to those who 
wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.23 
Therefore, even when politicians have the national interest at heart they 
may use intelligence organizations in ways that ordinary citizens would not 
accept The use of the armed forces during the FLQ "crisis" may have been 
such a situation. The following transcript of Canadian Broadcasting Corpo-
ration's reporter Tim Ralfe's 14 October 1970 interview with the then Prime 
Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau illustrates the latitude a government may as-
sume with respect to civil rights when they believe mat they are protecting 
"national security." 
Trudeau: There's a lot of bleeding hearts around who just 
don't like to see people with helmets and guns. All I can say 
is "Go on and bleed," but it's more important to keep law and 
order in mis society than to uh, uh, be worried about uh, weak-
kneed people who uh, don't like the looks of a, of... 
Ralfe: At any cost? At any cost? How far would you go with 
that? How far would you extend mat? 
Trudeau: Well, just watch me. 
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Ralfe: At, at reducing civil liberties? To that extent? 
Trudeau: To what extent? 
Ralfe: Well wouldn't,... if you extend this and you say, okay 
you're gonna do anything to protect them, this... include wire 
tapping, uh, reducing other civil liberties in some ways? 
Trudeau: Yes, I think that society must take every means at its 
disposal to defend itself against the, uh, emergent of a parallel 
power which defies the elected power in this country, and I 
think that goes to any distance. 
There have also been a number of examples in recent history which 
illustrate that governments are not reluctant to use the term "national security" 
to achieve self-serving political goals as opposed to national security ends. 
The most infamous example is that of past President Nixon's discussion with 
John Dean and H.R. Haldeman with respect to the break-in at the offices of 
the Democratic National Committee in the Watergate buildings in Washing-
ton DC. The following is an excerpt of a conversation between these three 
men on 21 March 1973 in the Oval Office: 
President: What is the answer on this? How you keep it out, 
I don't know. You can't keep it out if Hunt talks. You see the 
point is irrelevant. It has gotten to this point — 
Dean: You might put it on a national security grounds basis. 
Haldeman: It absolutely was. 
Dean: And say that this was — 
Haldeman: (unintelligible) — CIA — 
Dean: Ah — 
Haldeman: Seriously, 
President: National Security. We had to get information for 
national security grounds.26 
The argument can be made that, with proper accountability procedures 
in place, a government would not be able to use security services for their own 
political purposes. However, without a definition, or test, of "national secu-
rity" how can any system of accountability recognize when a security service 
(as agent for a government) is misusing the tremendous power that can be 
wielded in the name of national security? 
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NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE CAUTIOUS HAND 
OF THE JUDICIARY27 
Since the advent of die Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms the 
judiciary of Canada has taken on a new role. With regard to the courts' new 
role Madame Justice Bertha Wilson, while delivering the David B. Goodman 
Memorial Lectures at the University of Toronto in 1985, noted that: 
We can no longer rely on the doctrine of the supremacy of 
Parliament as a reason for staying our hand . . .. I think the 
conclusion is inescapable that die scope of judicial review of 
legislative and executive acts has been vastly expanded under 
the Charter and that, indeed, the courts have become mediators 
between the state and the individual.... The courts, in other 
words, have been given the responsibility for developing some 
kind of balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens 
on the one hand and the right and obligation of democratically 
elected governments to govern on the other. The challenge for 
the courts is to develop norms against which the reasonable-
ness of the impairment of a person's rights can be measured in 
a vast variety of different contexts. But not only that These 
norms must reflect to the maximum extent possible the politi-
cal ideal of a free and democratic society.28 
The impact of the Charter on judicial decision-making has not had a 
dramatic effect on their review of legislative and executive acts with respect 
to national security. In this area the courts appear to show deference for the 
government's position. The result is the potential for abuse of Canadians' 
rights and freedoms. This can be illustrated with a review of the two primary 
areas the courts become involved in when dealing with national security 
issues. These areas are, firstly, the issuing of warrants in order that CSIS can 
investigate a threat to the security of Canada, and secondly, in determining the 
validity of die government's objection to disclosing information on the grounds 
that disclosure would be injurious to national security. 
A. The Warrant Process 
The warrant process is governed by sections 21 through 28 of the CSIS 
Act An application for a warrant can be made by either the Director or an 
employee of the Service to a judge of the Federal Court.29 The applicant must 
have "reasonable grounds" to believe that a warrant is necessary to "enable the 
Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada or to perform its duties 
and functions under section 16." Further, it is a requirement that the approval 
of the Solicitor General be obtained before any application is made. 
Subsection 21(2) sets out the details of what must be specified in the 
affidavit accompanying an application for a warrant. Paragraph 21(2)(b) sets 
out three conditions, one of which must be met before an application may be 
made. The three conditions are as follows: 
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(1) other investigative procedures have been tried and have 
failed or why it appears that they are unlikely to succeed; or 
(2) the urgency of the matter is such that it would be imprac-
tical to carry out the investigation using only other investiga-
tive procedures; or 
(3) without a section 21 warrant it is unlikely that information 
of importance with respect to a threat to the security of Canada 
or the collection of information concerning foreign states and 
persons in order to assist the Minister of National Defence or 
the Secretary of State for External Affairs would not be ob-
tained. 
In Regina v.Atwal, the Federal Court of Appeal held that the "... failure 
to describe in the warrant the perceived threat to the security of Canada in 
terms other than the words of the Act, does not render the warrant invalid on 
its face."30 The Federal Court of Appeal found support for this proposition in 
a number of decisions involving wiretap authorizations.31 
It is clear that Criminal Code wiretap authorizations have not 
been struck down for want of particularity when, in the nature 
of the investigation for which they were issued, die missing 
particulars were not reasonably to be expected to be forthcom-
ing in advance. 
The Court in Atwal felt mat it would generally be less practical to be 
specific, in advance, in authorizations to intercept private communications 
under the CSIS Act man under die Criminal Code. The Code contemplates 
interception of information after or during an event, while the provisions of 
die CSIS Act are designed to gamer information to anticipate a future event. 
This distinction was acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court in 
U.S. v. US. District Cour?1 when it stated: 
Moreover, we do not hold that the same type of standards and 
procedures prescribed by Tide m are necessarily applicable to 
Ulis case, We recognize that domestic security surveillance 
may involve different policy and practical considerations from 
die surveillance of "ordinary crime". The garnering of security 
intelligence is often long range and involves die interrelations 
of various sources and types of information. The exact targets 
of such surveillance may be more difficult to identify Ulan in 
surveillance operations against many types of crime specified 
in Tide HI. Often, too, die emphasis of domestic intelligence 
gathering is on die prevention of unlawful activity or die en-
hancement of die Government's preparedness for some possi-
ble future crisis or emergency. Thus, die focus of domestic 
surveillance may be less precise man mat directed against more 
conventional types of crime. 
Ahhough section 21 does not require a judge to believe, on reasonable 
grounds, mat an offence has been committed or mat evidence of die offence 
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will be found at the place of the search, the majority of the Federal Court of 
Appeal in Atwal felt section 21 met the minimum standards for a reasonable 
search and seizure required by the Charter. The Court relied on the Supreme 
Court of Canada's decision in Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc.33 in which Justice 
Brian Dickson, as he then was, said: 
The State's interest in detecting and preventing crime begins to 
prevail over the individual's interest in being left alone at the 
point where credibly-based probability replaces suspicion. 
History has confirmed the appropriateness of this requirement 
as the threshold for subordinating the expectation of privacy to 
the needs of law enforcement Where the State's interest is not 
simply law enforcement as, for instance, where State security 
is involved, or where the individual's interest is not simply his 
expectation of privacy as, for instance, when the search threat-
ens his bodily integrity, the relevant standard might well be a 
different one. That is not the situation in the present case. In 
cases like the present, reasonable and probable grounds, estab-
lished upon oath, to believe that an offence has been committed 
and that there is evidence to be found at the place of search, 
constitutes the minimum standard, consistent with s.8 of the 
Charter, for authorizing search and seizure. 
The majority of the Court in Atwal stated that Hunter anticipated that 
a different standard should apply when national security is involved. The 
Court expressed that this standard is not necessarily lower but one that takes 
into account reality.34 Justice Hugessen's dissenting reasons in Atwal are more 
attractive than the reasons of the majority. Hugessen recognized that the issue 
is where to draw the line between the individuals' expectations of being left 
alone and the state's need to defend itself against attack.35 For any search or 
seizure to be reasonable, there must be an objective test to guide the judicial 
officer who is called upon to authorize the intrusion. As the Supreme Court 
of Canada stated in Hunter:36 
The location of the constitutional balance between a justifiable 
expectation of privacy and the legitimate needs of the State 
cannot depend on the subjective appreciation of individual 
adjudicators. Some objective standard must be established. 
Justice Hugesson stated, "The words 'required to enable the Service to 
investigate a threat to the security of Canada', employ language mat is so 
broad as to provide no objective standard at all."37 Even when one considers 
the importance of the state interest involved, the extent of a possible intrusion 
into the privacy of the citizen is wholly disproportionate.38 As Hunter39 
pointed out: 
. . . it is the Legislature's responsibility to enact legislation that 
embodies appropriate safeguards to comply with the Constitu-
tion's requirements. It should not fall to the courts to fill in the 
details that will render legislation lacunae constitutional. With-
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out appropriate safeguards legislation authorizing search and 
seizure is inconsistent with s.8 of the Charter. 
Hugesson correctly demonstrated that section 21 does not provide any 
reasonable standard by which a judge may test the need for the warrant:40 
There is no requirement to show that the intrusion into the 
citizen's privacy will afford the evidence of the alleged threat 
or will help to confirm its existence or non-existence. Nothing 
in the language of the statute requires a direct relationship 
between the information it is hoped to obtain from the inter-
cepted communication and the alleged threat to the security of 
Canada. On the contrary, the relationship that is required to be 
established on reasonable grounds appears to be between the 
interception and the investigation of the threat. In practical 
terms this means that the statutory language is broad enough to 
authorize die interception, in the most intrusive possible man-
ner, of the private communications of an intended victim of a 
terrorist attack without his knowledge or consent. Even more 
alarming, it would also allow an interception whose purpose 
was not directly to obtain information about die threat being 
investigated at all, but rather to advance the investigation by 
obtaining other information which could then be used as a 
bargaining tool in the pursuit of the investigation. 
The dissenting opinion of Justice Hugesson in Atwal is particularly 
convincing when compared to the reasoning of the majority. The majority's 
unquestioning acceptance of a CSIS affidavit in support of an application for 
a warrant is an indication of the court's deference to government concerns 
with respect to national security. The potential victim of this blind faim is 
Canadians' right to privacy. Hugessen was correct; section 21 of the CSIS Act 
does not provide an objective standard by which a judge may balance the 
expectation of privacy of an individual and the need of the State to protect 
itself. 
The CSIS Act should be amended so as to provide die adjudicators with 
such an objective standard. However, even if die CSIS Act was amended to 
state that, in order to issue a warrant, the court had to be satisfied that me 
intrusion into a citizen's privacy will afford evidence of an alleged threat, the 
court is still left to decide what constitutes evidence of an alleged threat to the 
security of Canada. In short, the court will have to wrestle with two questions: 
first, what are me dimensions of die term "national security," and second, is 
Ulis a case which falls widiin mose dimensions? The problem of uncertainty 
as to die scope and meaning of the phrase "threats to the security of Canada" 
does little to help guide the judicial officer to the correct decision when called 
on to authorize an intrusion. 
Unlike Criminal Code warrants, which are subject to review by the 
courts at the trial of an accused, information collected, pursuant to a warrant 
by CSIS will not ordinarily be subjected to such a test In fact it is unusual 
46 
Conflict Quarterly 
for information collected pursuant to a CSIS Act warrant to be brought into 
evidence during law enforcement proceedings. Therefore, the requirement 
that the CSIS Act contain a reasonable standard by which a judge may test the 
need for a warrant becomes even more evident when a subsequent review of 
the issuing of a warrant is unlikely. 
B. Government's Objection to Disclosure of Information41 
Prior to 1983, the Crown's refusal to disclose a document on the basis 
that its contents could be injurious to national security was not subject to 
judicial review. Subsection 41(2) of the Federal Court Act read as follows: 
When a Minister of the Crown certifies to any court by affida-
vit that the production or discovery of a document or its con-
tents would be injurious to international relations, national 
defence or security, or to federal-provincial relations, or that it 
would disclose a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for 
Canada, discovery and production shall be refused without any 
examination of the document by the court42 
Subsection 41(2) was repealed in 1983.43 Now, claims of Crown privi-
lege are provided for by sections 37,38 and 39 of the Canada Evidence Act44 
As a result of these sections, in cases where international relations or national 
defence or security are said to be compromised by disclosure of information, 
the government's objection will be subject to review.45 Pursuant to subsection 
37(2) a superior court has the right to examine the information sought and the 
power to overrule the objection, " . . . if it concludes that, in the circumstances 
of the case, the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance the 
specified public interest" 
In Gold v. The Queen In Right Of Canada*6 the Federal Court of Appeal 
stated: 
Parliament has recognized that the public interest in national 
security, militating against disclosure, may be outweighed by 
the public interest in the administration of justice, militating in 
favour of disclosure . . .. Parliament has manifestly found it 
expedient to substitute a judicial discretion for what was here-
tofore an absolute right on the part of the executive to refuse 
disclosure. It is not to be assumed that any of this transpired 
because the government of the day was spontaneously taken by 
a selfless desire to share its secrets. The executive had been 
unable to sustain the credibility of the system of absolute 
privilege codified in s-s. 41 (2).47 
Although it is a court's duty to balance the competing public interests 
with those of an accused's right to make full answer and defence it appears 
that upholding the government's objection to the disclosure of information on 
national security grounds is virtually automatic. 
In Regina v. Kevork, Balian, and Gharakhanian4* the Ontario High 
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Court was faced with a case in which an accused was denied disclosure of 
certain evidence because of a Court order pursuant to section 36.149 of the 
Canada Evidence Act The accused in Kevork applied for an order for 
production of documents or an order to stay proceedings on charges of con-
spiracy and attempted murder. The defence argued that the accused's right to 
fundamental justice (section 7 of the Charter) would be breached if evidence 
was not made available to their counsel. Justice Smith stated that the burden 
is on the accused to persuade the Court that there is evidence being denied of 
a critical nature without which the applicant will probably not be able to make 
full answer and defence.30 The Court reasoned that this is a reasonable burden 
in order to avoid fishing expeditions in all cases where it is likely that the CSIS 
had some hand in gathering information. 
Although the Court in Kevork recognized that its decision could put an 
accused in a "catch-22" situation,51 unable to mount a challenge for lack of a 
factual basis, the alternative solution is unacceptable. As the Court stated, "To 
stay in the case at hand, or in any case, where only some or any material 
information is withheld comes close to conferring immunity from prosecution 
upon all those charged with terrorist acts."52 
In Re Goguen and Albert and Gibson5* it was held that the Chief Justice 
of the Federal Court can refuse to order disclosure of documents even if he did 
not inspect the documents. The Chief Justice can simply rely on the certificate 
of the Solicitor General and a secret affidavit filed to explain why disclosure 
would be injurious to national security. The courts, both in Kevork* and in 
Gold v. The Queen In Right of Canada5' agreed with the decision in Re 
Goguen and Albert and Gibson that there is no requirement for a court to 
inspect the information before making its determination not to disclose the 
information. The court in Gold did add however, that: 
It will not be well served if it appears that the exercise of 
judicial discretion is automatically abdicated because national 
security is accepted as so vital that the fair administration of 
justice is assumed incapable of outweighing iL Each applica-
tion under s. 36.2 must be dealt with on its own merits.36 
Moreover, the court in Kevork stated that: 
A case could arise where the defence will make a strong case 
for disclosure, for purposes of a fair trial, in which the Federal 
court refused even to inspect The trial court might then have 
to impose a conditional stay urging inspection at least so that 
an informed decision can be made.57 
In Re Hernie and Security Intelligence Review Committee et al.5* the 
Court decided to exercise its discretion and examine documents which the 
government would not disclose to Mr. Hernie, in order to determine if the 
evidence should be disclosed. Mr. Henrie was an employee of the Federal 
Government An upgrade in his security clearance was denied because the 
organizations which Mr. Henrie belonged to (Workers' Communist Party 
MarxistZ-Leninist (WCPM-L) and the Groupe Marxiste Léniniste Liberation 
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(GMLL)) were considered by CSIS to constitute a threat to the security of 
Canada. Mr. Henrie was not allowed to review some of the evidence consid-
ered by the Review Committee at his hearing. The Court felt that the non-
disclosed evidence was highly relevant in deciding whether the political 
organizations to which Mr. Henrie belonged could constitute a threat to 
national security. Therefore, the Court exercised its discretion in favor of 
examining the evidence. In deciding not to disclose the evidence to Mr. 
Henrie the Court stated: 
An examination of the documents and of the evidence men-
tioned in the certificate of objection convinces me that the 
disclosure of whatever infonnation in those documents which 
might in any way pertain to the issue of whether the W.C.P.M.-
L. or the G.M.L.L. were organizations which might or might 
not constitute a threat to the security of Canada, would prove 
injurious to national security because, generally speaking, such 
disclosure would either (a) identify or tend to identify human 
sources and technical sources; (b) identify or tend to identify 
past or present individuals or groups who are or are not the 
subject of investigation; (c) identify or tend to identify tech-
niques and methods of operation for the intelligence service; 
(d) identify or tend to identify members of the service; (e) 
jeopardize or tend to jeopardize security of the services tel-
ecommunications and cypher systems; (f) reveal the intensity 
of the investigation; (g) reveal the degree of success or of lack 
of success of the investigation.59 
The Court's arguments put forward to justify non-disclosure of the 
documents did not involve an analysis of the potential threat to national 
security posed by the political organizations to which Mr. Henrie belonged. 
Instead the Court felt that the threat to the security of Canada was to be found 
in the disclosure of the operating methods of CSIS which could be uncovered 
by disclosing the relevant information. Therefore, if the disclosure of infor-
mation which pertains to the issue of whether a group or an individual might 
or might not be a threat to the security of Canada may uncover CSIS operating 
procedures, it will not be released. 
This is an inappropriate test to determine if government information 
should be released to an individual so that he or she may defend him/herself 
against government accusations. No matter how innocent the individual's 
activities (or those of a group to which the individual is associated), this test 
will effectively stymie an individual's ability to obtain information for de-
fence against career limiting allegations or criminal charges brought by the 
government 
The Court in Henrie continued to show its deference to the position of 
the government when, refusing to consider editing the documents for Mr. 
Henrie's use, it stated: u[F]urthermore, there always remains the danger that, 
however innocuous the disclosure of information might appear to be to me, it 
might in fact prove to be injurious to national security."60 
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The recent Federal Court of Appeal decision in Chiarelli v. Minister of 
Employment and Immigration61 provides evidence that the courts may be 
willing to more fairly balance an individual's right to know about allegations 
made against him or her and the government's need to safeguard national 
security information. Mr. Chiarelli, a permanent resident, was convicted of a 
crime which, pursuant to the Immigration Act, required his deportation. Mr. 
Chiarelli appealed his deportation order to the Immigration Appeal Board. As 
part of the appeal process Mr. Chiarelli was entitled to an investigation 
conducted by the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) and to 
make representations to it. In order to protect police sources of information, 
Mr. Chiarelli was excluded when evidence from the RCMP was heard. Sub-
section 48(2) of the CSIS Act permitted Mr. Chiarelli's exclusion from the 
RCMP's representations to SIRC. In finding that Mr. Chiarelli's section 7 
Charter right (the right to life liberty and security of the person) had been 
infringed the majority of the Court stated: 
The provision could have achieved its objectives while infring-
ing the appellant's rights far less severely than it has done by 
providing a balancing mechanism rather than a total denial of 
the appellant's rights . . .. In addition, there may well be 
circumstances where disclosure of the information is unavoid-
ably necessary to establish the innocence of the person against 
whom the allegations have been made, and in such circum-
stances the infringement of the right in question, in my view, 
would be out of proportion to the objective sought to be 
achieved.62 
Further, the Court held that the infringement of Mr. Chiarelli's rights was not 
justified under section 1 of the Charter.63 
The report of the Special Committee on the Review of the Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service Act and the Security Offences Act stated that 
they accepted the decision of the Court in Chiarelli.6* The Special Committee 
suggested that the government should amend subsection 48(2) of the CSIS Act 
in order to better balance the right of an individual to know the allegations 
made against him or her and the state's interest in safeguarding national 
security interests.65 The Committee's suggestion was ignored by the govern-
ment in its response to the Committee's report.66 However, the government 
would appear to disagree with the Special Committee's suggestion because it 
has applied for leave to appeal the decision in the Chiarelli case to the 
Supreme Court of Canada. 
CONCLUSION: THE PROBLEM OF DEFINING 
THE PHRASE "NATIONAL SECURITY" 
What is a "threat to the security of Canada"? When are politicians using 
the term "national security" as an explanation for government action, as 
opposed to an excuse? What criteria should the judiciary use in order to 
become more activist in their review of both warrant applications pursuant to 
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the CSIS Act and the government's objection to disclosing information on the 
grounds that it would be injurious to national security? In order to answer 
these questions it is necessary to explore the dimensions of the term "national 
security." As governments look forward to the 1990s and have to assess the 
intelligence requirements for the upcoming decade the need to clarify the term 
"national security" will become increasingly important 
Identifying the dimensions of the term "national security" will be no 
less complicated than attempting to answer any of the above questions. It has 
been stated that: 
[a]ny attempt to define the interest of national security, and to 
develop policies and programs to serve that interest, must 
articulate the conception of the state (or nation) which is to be 
protected; only then can the tension between the interests of the 
state and the interests of individuals be placed in its proper 
context and analyzed with a view to making some progress 
towards resolving that tension.*7 
Attempting to define what is a "national security interest" will be the first step 
toward establishing a basis from which we can answer other questions posed 
in this article. 
It is necessary to develop a theory of "national security" which will be 
able to differentiate between "national interests" and "national security inter-
ests." A threat to either of these interests could be seen as detrimental to the 
interests of Canada. However, it is a question of degree. For example, cross-
border shopping is detrimental to the interests of Canada, but few would argue 
that the arsenal of intrusive investigative techniques available to CSIS should 
be turned loose on those offenders. Matters which fall within the "national 
security" net will be those which, more often then not, will require the use of 
extraordinary powers by the state. When protecting "national security inter-
ests" the state's actions will have the propensity to come into direct conflict 
with individual's rights and freedoms. Infringement of Charter rights and/or 
freedoms in the name of a "national security interest" will be prima facia 
justifiable. However, it is important to note that not every "national interest" 
be regarded as a "national security interest" 
A "national security interest" is an interest in protecting the security of 
the state. In international law the essential characteristics of a state are long 
settled.68 Generally, a state must have territory, a population, a government 
capable of maintaining effective control over its territory and be capable of 
conducting international relations with other states. International law does not 
concern itself with die domestic affairs of a state. For example, there is no rule 
of international law which prohibits secession from an existing state; nor is 
there any rule which forbids a mother-state from attempting to quash a 
secessionary movement69 
Territorial integrity is the cornerstone of statehood in international law. 
Therefore, perhaps "national security interests" should be linked to the protec-
tion of the territorial integrity of the state from foreign military aggression or 
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from preparation for military aggression through covert activities. If this were 
the case it could be argued that only in situations in which a state's territorial 
integrity is at risk from foreign aggression (or foreign-influenced aggression) 
should an infringement of an individual's Charter rights and or freedoms be 
prima facia justifiable. In all other matters, including matters of "national 
interest," the state's laws, and the interpretation of those laws, should include 
a more balanced approach to dealing with the competing interests of individu-
als' rights and freedoms and the state's interests. 
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